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TAX ISSUES OF PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATH AWARDS
I. INTRODUCTION
The laws of tort and taxation converge when an injured person
seeks to recover damages from a tortfeasor.' Compensable injuries
may include pain and suffering, disfigurement, medical expenses, loss
of future earning capacity, loss of consortium, and lost wages.2 Dam-
age awards for personal injury and wrongful death are excluded from
gross income under the Internal Revenue Code3 and most state tax
laws.4 Additionally, the majority rule permits computation of lost
wages using gross rather than net income as the measure of damages.5
I. The tax consequences of the award must be weighed in anticipation of either settlement
or trial. This Comment deals with tax issues presented in the trial setting. For practical tax con-
siderations in drafting a settlement or judgment, see Moe, The Tax Effects of Tort Damager, 26
PRAC. LAW. 37 (Jan. 15, 1980); Phillips, Federal Income Taxation of Damages Paid or Received in
Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1238 (1979). Tax consequences should always be explained to clients in
order to effectuate informed decisionmaking during the course of the lawsuit. 3 M. MINZER, J.
NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD, & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT AcTiONS § 17:13, at 17-
46 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MINZER].
2. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 86-92 (1935); H. MCGREGOR,
MAYNE AND McGREGOR ON DAMAGES 35-48 (12th ed. 1961).
3. (a) IN GENERAL
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions al-
lowed under Section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year,
gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness; ....
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982). The exclusion covers compensatory and punitive damages received as a
result of personal injury or sickness. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Although I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
is primarily used to exclude damages for bodily injury, awards for nonphysical injuries are also
excluded. [1984] 1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 680 (1983). Damages paid under wrongful
death statutes are also nontaxable. Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180.
The exemption does not cover payments for breach of employment contracts and claims for
unpaid rent, salaries, dividends, or lost profits. Moe, supra note 1, at 41.
4. MINZER, supra note I, at 17-46. Oklahoma tax laws do not provide for exclusions be-
cause Oklahoma taxable income is based upon adjusted gross income calculated under the United
States Internal Revenue Code. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2353(13) (1981). Because the federal income
tax must be calculated before the Oklahoma income tax can be determined, personal injury
awards are also excluded from Oklahoma state income tax. [1 Okla.] ST. TAX. REP. (CCH) 1 10-
701 (Nov. 1983).
5. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 589, 594-99 (1982). The "gross income rule" relates to the use
of a plaintiffs before-tax income as the measure of damages; the "net income rule" utilizes after-
tax income. Fitzpatrick, Assessing the Impact of Future Taxes in Computing Lost Future Earnings:
Practical, Legal and Equitable Considerations, 27 DEF. L.J. 93, 95-96 (1978).
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The plaintiff, in effect, is relieved of federal and state tax liabilities on
past and future lost income.6
Although Congress enacted the personal injury exclusion in 1918,'
defense lawyers did not begin to argue the impact of taxation upon
damage awards until 1944.8 As the tax consequences of the award be-
came a disputed issue, defendants asserted two basic arguments: (1) ev-
idence of the plaintiffs income tax burden should be admitted because
the award for lost income is nontaxable;9 (2) jurors should be apprised
of the tax exemptions to prevent overcompensation. 10 Notwithstanding
acceptance of these arguments by commentators during the following
two decades,1 the courts generally excluded evidence of plaintiffs' tax
6. The plaintiff is not relieved of all future tax liabilities, however, because interest earned
on any part of the invested award is taxable. See infra note 159. The government does not lose
tax revenue by exempting personal injury awards from taxable income since the tortfeasor is not
allowed to deduct the damage award from his taxable income unless authorized by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). See Moe, supra note 1, at 43. The lost-revenue problem created by the
exemption has been the subject of several tax articles. See Harris, Compensation for Loss of In-
come and its Taxation: Comment, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 135 (1981); Kahane & Voran, Compensation
for Loss of Income and Its Taxatiorn: A Policy Anaysis, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 118 (1979); Yorio, The
Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 701, 721 &
nn.138-39 (1977).
7. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (1919) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982)); see supra note 3 (current text of the exclusion).
8. The first published appellate opinions were Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1944), and Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944).
9. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497, 502 (1949); Dempsey v. Thompson,
363 Mo. 339, _ 251 S.W.2d 42, 43 (1952).
10. See, e.g., Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750, 751 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Maus v.
New York, Chi. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, _ 135 N.E.2d 253, 254 (1956).
11. Burns, A Compensation Award For Personal Injury or Wrongful Death is Tax-Exempt:
Should We Tell The Jury?, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 320, 330-31 (1965); Feldman, Personal Injury
Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARiz. L. REv. 272, 282 (1966); Morris &
Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A. J. 274, 276,
328 (1960); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212, 238-39
(1958); Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 11
WASH. L. REv. 351, 370 (1969); Comment, Personal Injury Awards and the Nonexistent Income
Tax-What is a Proper Jury Charge?, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 98, 102-03 (1957); Note, Income
Taxation and Damages for Personal Injuries, 50 KY. L.J. 601, 609 (1962); Comment, Income Tax
Aspects of Personal Injury Litigation, 37 TEx. L. REV. 77 (1958); Note, Damages-The Role of
Income Tax Exemption in Actionsfor PersonalInjuries, 32 TEx. L. REV. 108, 110-11 (1953); Note,
Damages: Personal Injury Actions: Instructions on Taxability of Damages, 4 UCLA L. REV. 636,
640-41 (1956-57); Note, Instructing the Jury Not to Consider Income Taxation In Personal Injury
Award, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 128, 131 (1962); Note, Consideration of Tax Aspects in Awarding Dam-
agesfor Personal Injuries, 9 VAND. L. REV. 543, 550 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Note, Considera-
tion]; Comment, Damages-Propriety of Jury's Considering Plaintif's Income Tax Liabilities in
Computing Damagesfor Personal Injuries, 11 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 66, 73-74 (1954); 42 GEO. L.J.
149, 151 (1953); 44 Ky. L.J. 385, 388 (1955). Contra Lambert, 16 N.A.C.C.A. L.J. 211, 217 (1955);
Note, Damages-Income Tax As A Factor in Measuring Personal Injury Awards, 8 ARK. L. REV.
174, 177 (1954); Note, Deduction of Taxes in Computing Damages for Impairment of Earning Ca-
pacity, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 784 (1951); Note, Income TaxAsA Factor In Measuring Personal
2
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liabilities12 and refused requests for instructions that informed juries of
the nontaxable status of awards.' 3 English courts had rejected net tax
InjuryAwards, 35 N.C.L. REV. 401,404 (1957); 33 B.U.L. REv. 114, 116 (1953); 69 HARV. L. REV.
1945, 1946 (1956); 42 IowA L. REv. 134, 137 (1956); 32 NEB. L. REv. 491, 494 (1952).
12. See, e.g., Boston & M.R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 291 (1st Cir. 1966) (excluding tax
evidence in a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) case); United States v. Sommers, 351 F.2d
354, 360 (10th Cir. 1965) (use of net income is discretionary in a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
case); Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S & M/S Trolleggen, 333 F.2d 308, 313 (2d Cir.
1964) (reversing trial court's use of net income in a diversity action governed by New York
Wrongful Death Act); Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1963) (FTCA case
holding that gross income is to be used when earnings not above the middle scale); McWeeney v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.) (declining to permit net tax evidence in a
FELA action but indicating that a different result might be reached if the tax impact was substan-
tial), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 927 (9th Cir.)
(FELA case approving use of net income), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Chicago & N.W. Ry.
v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 1949) (excluding net income evidence in a FELA action);
Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944) (refusing to deduct taxes in maritime
action); Tarter v. Souderton Motor Co., 257 F. Supp. 598, 602 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (refusing to con-
sider income tax consequences as a basis for an excessive jury award); Bealieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d
665, 673 (Alaska 1967) (excluding net evidence in a personal injury action); Hall v. Chicago &
N.W.R.R., 5 Ill. 2d 135, ..., 125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1955) (refusing net income evidence in a FELA
action); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, _ 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952); Girard Trust Corn
Exch. Bank v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 530, 538, 190 A.2d 293, 298 (1963) (refusing net
income evidence); Hoge v. Anderson, 200 Va. 364, _ 106 S.E.2d 121, 123-24 (1958) (approving
use of gross income in personal injury action); cf. O'Loughlin v. Detroit & M. Ry., 22 Mich. App.
146, - 177 N.W.2d 430, 435 (1970) (refusing to review deduction issue when net income not in
evidence). Contra Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969) (affirming the district
court's use of net income in an FTCA case tried before a judge); Furumizo v. United States, 381
F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1967) (approving use of net income under FTCA); O'Connor v. United
States, 269 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1959) (interpreting Oklahoma law to require use of net in-
come in FTCA action); Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 632 (D.S.C. 1967) (deducting
taxes from prospective earnings in a wrongful death action); Nollenberger v. United Airlines, Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 734, 743 (D.C. Cal. 1963) (using net income in wrongful death action), mod on other
grounds sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
951 (1964); Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F. Supp. 183, 188 (D. Conn. 1961) (holding that
net earnings are the proper measure of damages in a wrongful death action); Meehan v. Central
R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (allowing income tax evidence in consideration of
excessive jury verdict); Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Iowa 1969) (net evidence in a
wrongful death action is admissible).
13. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.) (FELA
action), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); New York Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522, 527 (6th
Cir. 1958); Caporossi v. Atlantic City, N.J., 220 F. Supp. 508, 525 (D.N.J. 1963); Moffa v. Perkins
Trucking Co., 200 F. Supp. 183, 189 (D. Conn. 1961); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., & 0. Ry., 135 F.
Supp. 750, 757 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, _, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038
(1956); Henninger v. Southern Pac. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 878, 59 Cal. Rptr. 76, 81 (1967);
Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 589, 298 P.2d 700, 709
(1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1956) (FELA
case); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 52, ..._, 410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966); Hall v. Chicago & N.W.
R.R., 5 Ill. 2d 135, _, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) (FELA case); Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 I11.
App. 2d 445,_, 129 N.E.2d 771, 772 (1955) (FELA case); Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, -
134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, _ 350 P.2d 18,
22 (1960); Bracy v. Great N.R.R., 136 Mont. 65, _..., 343 P.2d 848, 835 (1959) (FELA case); Briggs
v. Chicago Great W.R.R., 248 Minn. 418, _ 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957) (FELA case); Maus v. New
York, Chi. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, _, 135 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1956) (FELA case); Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1962) (FELA case); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v.
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evidence during the 1940's,14 and American courts often cited the Eng-
lish decisions. 15 Interestingly, American courts did not reverse their
positions when the English courts subsequently chose to consider in-
come tax consequences. 16
The Second Circuit developed a flexible approach to net income
tax evidence in Mc Weeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road,'7 stating that the plaintiffs tax burden could be considered if the
income was above "the lower or middle reach of the income scale."'
18
The flexible approach is indicative of a more favorable reception of
both arguments by federal courts in the 1970's when federal law con-
trolled' 9 or state law was unclear, dated, or silent.20 However, federal
Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619,_. 376 S.W.2d 745, 749 (1963); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. McFer-
rin, 156 Tex. 69,_, 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956); John F. Buckner & Sons v. Allen, 289 S.W.2d
387, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396,
- 94 N.W.2d 577, 583 (1959). Contra Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, - 136 A.2d
918, 925-26 (1957); Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So. 2d 439,442-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Stager v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 163 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, _ 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952); Towli v. Ford Motor Co., 30
A.D.2d 319, ....., 292 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (1968) (reversing trial court for refusing to answer jury inquiry
during deliberation); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, _, 122 S.E.2d 18, 30-31 (1961) (giving
instruction is not reversible error); cf. St. John's River Terminal Co. v. Vaden, 190 So. 2d 40, 42
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (no error when defendant failed to demonstrate legal right to the
instruction).
14. Billingham v. Hughes, [1949] 1 K.B. 643 (C.A). For a discussion of the English common
law regarding taxes and damage awards, see Note, Consideration, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750, 751 (N.D. Iowa 1955).
16. Billingham was overruled in British Transport Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] 2 W.L.R. 41
(H.L.).
17. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
18. Id. at 38-39 (refusing tax evidence on annual income of $4,800). The court noted the
vagueness of this approach when it stated, "Just where the line should be drawn must be left, as so
much is, to the good sense of trial judges." Id. at 39. Subsequent decisions give guidance as to
annual wage amounts that would qualify for the exception; however, these figures would require
adjustment for inflation. See In re Marina Mercante Nicaraguense S.A., 364 F.2d 118, 126 (2d
Cir. 1966) (deduction denied for $11,000 annual income), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Leroy
v. Sabena Belgian World Airways, 344 F.2d 266, 276 (2d Cir.) (deduction appropriate for annual
income of $16,000), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen, 333
F.2d 308, 318 (2d Cir. 1964) (deduction denied for annual income of $6,281); Montellier v. United
States, 315 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1963) (trial court has discretion in the $11-12,000 range).
One judge noted the inconsistency of allowing the instruction when plaintiffs income falls in
a high tax bracket but refusing it in small or middle income cases. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling,
510 F.2d 234, 242 (5th Cir.) (Gee, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
19. Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979) (favoring tax instruction
in FELA cases but postponing reconsideration of current position until Supreme Court decided
Liepelt); Saurs v. Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238, 247 (9th Cir. 1979) (using net income in admiralty
action when gross earnings in upper income scale); Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1331
(9th Cir. 1979) (approving deduction of income taxes from award in action brought under FTCA);
First Nat'l Bank v. Material Serv. Corp., 597 F.2d 1110, 1120 (7th Cir. 1979) (deducting income
taxes in admiralty action when tax impact substantial); Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d
171, 178 (3d Cir. 1977) (approving use of gross earnings for future earnings but remanded for
recomputation of lost past earnings using net income rule); Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp.,
4
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courts were obligated to follow state law when it provided the substan-
tive rule of law.21 While the resurrected arguments in support of the
net income rule and the nontaxability instruction received continued
support from commentators22 and were more favorably accepted by a
few state courts,23 most states continued their adherence to the majority
578 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (adopting net income rule); Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger,
529 F.2d 284, 295-97 (9th Cir. 1975) (requiring net income evidence and jury instruction in FELA
case); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1123-24 (6th Cir. 1974) (refusing to reverse
trial court's giving of tax instruction in FELA case); Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d
1319, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (using net income in wrongful death action); Domeracki v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.) (requiring tax instruction in future cases), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Washington v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134,
1137 (D.D.C. 1979) (permitting jury to award damages based on net income); Bradshaw v. Rawl-
ings, 464 F. Supp. 175, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (affirming use of tax instruction). Contra Johnson v.
Penrod Drilling, 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.) (refusing to use net income rule in FELA case),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Rouse v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Superior Coop. Elevator
Co., 474 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1973) (affirming trial court's refusal of tax instruction in FELA
case); Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1973) (refusing tax instruc-
tion); Greco v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 464 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing tax instruc-
tion in a FELA case), cert denied, 410 U.S. 990 (1973); Consolidated Machs., Inc. v. Protein
Prods. Corp., 428 F. Supp. 209, 228 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (refusing to deduct taxes when income not
above middle level).
20. Mosley v. United States, 538 F.2d 555, 558 (4th Cir. 1976) (deducting income taxes from
award in FTCA case governed by North Carolina law); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 742 (3d
Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law requiring net income calculation); Felder v. United States,
543 F.2d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 1976) (deducting taxes in FTCA case); Downs v. United States, 522
F.2d 990, 1005 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Florida Wrongful Death Act requiring deduction for
taxes); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 185 (1st Cir. 1974) (interpreting Rhode Island
law to require admissibility of net income evidence). Contra Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d
809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1978) (disallowing deduction for taxes); Kennett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 560
F.2d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing tax instruction when neither expert mentioned net income
and New Hampshire law was not on point); Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., 390 F. Supp. 347,
352 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (refusing to reduce award for taxes when income not above middle level).
21. Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law
to preclude net income evidence); Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1976)
(applying Tennessee law that precluded nontaxability instruction); Feldman v. Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1287-88 (D. Conn. 1974) (applying Connecticut law to require net
income calculation).
22. Crosby, Impact of Inflation and Income Taxes on Future Damages in Personal Injury and
Death Cases, 12 FORUM 542, 553 (1977); Elligett, Income Tax Considerations in Florida Personal
Injury Actions, 36 U. MiAMi L. REV. 643, 644 (1982); Fitzpatrick, supra note 5, at 11; Note,
Instruction to the Jury on Federal Income Tax, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 700 (1972); Comment, Computa-
tion of Lost Future Earnings in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 11 IND. L. REV. 647,
690-91 (1978); Comment, Income Tax Effects on Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REV. 672,
690-91 (1970); Note, Income Taxes and the Computation ofLost Future Earnings in Wrongful Death
and Personal Injury Cases, 29 MD. L. REV. 177 (1969); Note, Jury Instruction on the Tax-Exelnpt
Status of the Personal Injury Award, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 972 (1972); Note, Jury May Properly Receive
Evidence and Instructions as to Impact ofInflation and Income Taxation, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 681,
700 (1976); Comment, Personal Injuries: Should Non-Taxability of Judgments Decrease Award?, 8
TULSA L.J. 242, 251-52 (1972).
23. Abele v. Massi, 273 A.2d 260, 261 (Del. 1970) (requiring tax instruction); Francis v, Gov-
ernment Employees Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (authorizing tax instruction);
Teal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 348 So. 2d 83, 86 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (allowing net income as measure of
lost wages); DeBose v. Trapani, 295 So. 2d 72, 74-75 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing tax instruction);
5
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rule.24
The United States Supreme Court breathed new life into the con-
troversy with its decision in Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt, 2' a
case brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).26
The Court held that a defendant in a FELA case must be allowed to
introduce evidence of the plaintiff's tax liability,27 and that the jury
should be instructed that the damage award is not taxable.28  The
Liepelt decision and its progeny29 compel federal and state courts to
reexamine the rationale of prior decisions that deny admission of net
Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, _, 341 A.2d 613, 623-29 (1975) (allowing net income
evidence and requiring jury instruction); Geris v. Burlington N., Inc., 277 Or. 381, _, 561 P.2d
174, 183 (1977) (mandating instruction when requested in FELA case).
24. Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171, _ 564 P.2d 394, 397 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (adopting net
income rule as measure of damages); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d
626, 668, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 423 (1978) (refusing to allow evidence of damage award investments
which would produce tax-free income); Good v. A.B. Chance, Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, _, 565 P.2d
217, 226 (1977) (refusing to permit tax impact evidence on future earnings); Polster v. Griffs of
America, Inc., 32 Colo. App. 264, _ 514 P.2d 80, 83 (1973) (refusing jury instruction), rev'd on
other grounds, 184 Colo. 418, 520 P.2d 745 (1974); High v. State Highway Dep't, 307 A.2d 799,
805 (Del. 1973) (refusing net tax evidence); Liepelt v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 62 Ill. App. 3d 653, 378
N.E.2d 1232, 1245 (1978) (rejecting tax instruction), rev'd, 444 U.S. 490, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972
(1980); Richmond Gas Corp. v. Reeves, 158 Ind. App. 272, , 302 N.E.2d 795, 812 (1973) (refus-
ing tax instruction utilizing arguments against net income evidence); Wickizer v. Medley, 169 Ind.
App. 332, ..._, 348 N.E,2d 96, 100 (1976) (holding that trial court erred by instructing jury but error
was harmless); Rediker v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., I Kan. App. 2d 581, _, 571 P.2d 70, 76
(1977) (refusing net income evidence in FELA case), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Reeves
v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 304 So. 2d 370, 377 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (disregarding tax liability for lost
earnings); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 536 (Me. 1978) (refusing tax instruction); Lumber
Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, _ 373 A.2d 282 (1977) (excluding net income
evidence); Anunti v. Payette, 268 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978) (refusing jury instruction); Senter v.
Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (refusing tax instruction after Missouri had
adopted standardized jury instructions); McGee v. Burlington N., Inc., 174 Mont. 466, - 571
P.2d 784, 791 (1977) (rejecting net income evidence in FELA case); Ott v. Frank, 202 Neb. 820, _..,
277 N.W.2d 251, 253 (1979) (refusing instruction); Coleman v. New York Transit Auth., 37
N.Y.2d 137, ., 332 N.E.2d 850, 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663, 670 (1975) (refusing instruction); Eriksen
v. Boyer, 225 N.W.2d 66, 73 (N.D. 1974) (refusing jury instruction); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.
v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630, 636 (Okla. 1971) (rejecting net income tax evidence in FELA case); Plourd
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666,_, 513 P.2d 1140, 1147-48 (1973) (refusing jury instruc-
tion); Salsgiver v. E.S. Ritter Co., 42 Or. App. 547, _ 600 P.2d 951, 952-53 (1979) (refusing tax
instruction subsequent to state court decision requiring instruction in FELA cases); Gradel v.
Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, _ 421 A.2d 674, 680 (1980) (refusing jury instruction); Stallcup v. Taylor,
463 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970) (refusing jury instruction); Turner v. General Motors
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 853 (rex. 1979) (refusing jury instruction); Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81
Wash. 2d 327, 333-34, 501 P.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1972) (refusing to deduct taxes in a wrongful death
action); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Rayburn, 213 Va. 812, , 195 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1973) (refusing instruc-
tion in FELA case).
25. 444 U.S. 490, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
26. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). Plaintiffs cause of action is created by a federal statute; how-
ever, the lawsuit may also be filed in a state court. Id. § 56.
27. 444 U.S. at 494.
28. Id. at 497-98.
29. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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income evidence and refuse jury instructions regarding taxability in ac-
tions created by other federal statutes or state law.
This Comment summarizes the two tax issues presented in tort ac-
tions involving personal injury or death, discusses the rationale given
by courts to preclude juror consideration of tax information, and
reevaluates this rationale in light of the Liepell decision. Finally,
Oklahoma case law on the tax consequences of damage awards is ana-
lyzed, and an approach is suggested for Oklahoma courts to follow in
the future.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE TAx ISSUES
After the jury has determined that the defendant is liable for a
personal injury or death, it must then calculate the damages to be
awarded. 30 The goal of compensatory damage awards is to make the
plaintiff whole-to place the injured person in the same monetary posi-
tion he would have enjoyed if the wrong had not occurred.3' Although
that goal can be simply and succinctly stated, its achievement in the
courtroom is quite difficult.32
Two tax issues contribute to the difficulty courts encounter in com-
pensating plaintiffs. The first issue is evidentiary in nature and arises
before33 or during the trial34 if lost wages are claimed as damages.3"
Lost wages may be sought by a plaintiff who is temporarily or perma-
nently disabled or by the decedent's estate under a wrongful death stat-
ute.36 The tax question raised by the lost wages claim is whether a
30. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 6.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1977); C. MCCORMICK, supra note
2, § 137, at 560; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
HARPER & JAMES]; J. STEIN, PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS § 1 (1972); see W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
32. The goal of exactness in the award amount competes with the necessity of keeping the
computation simple and practical.
33. Either party may file a motion in limine to determine whether net income evidence will
be admissible; however, the motion is usually a plaintiffs tool to preclude defendant's introduc-
tion of the evidence. See, e.g., Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171, _ 564 P.2d 394, 396 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977).
34. Most appeals concerning the admissibility of net income evidence are taken from rulings
that occur during the trial. Plaintiffs counsel objects when counsel for defendant attempts to
cross-examine plaintiffs economic expert regarding income taxes, introduce the evidence directly
through an expert, or argue tax liabilities during closing argument. For cases exemplifying these
objections, see supra notes 12, 24.
35. -Lost wages may include both past earnings from the date of the injury to the time of trial
and future earnings. Three factors are considered in the calculation of future earnings: base
earnings, average work-life expectancy, and trends in earnings. Franz, Should Income Taxes Be
Included When Calculating Lost Earnings?, 18 TRIAL, Oct. 1982, at 53, 54.
36. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1053(B), 1055 (1981).
[Vol. 19:702
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defendant should be required to pay an amount equal to the plaintiff's
gross or net earnings in order to fully compensate the plaintiff.37 Plain-
tiffs introduce gross earnings evidence as the basis for calculation of
damages while defendants attempt to prove that the actual "take
home" salary would have been much less because of tax liabilities.3
Defendants contend that an award based on gross income gives the
plaintiff an unjustified windfall because taxes will never be paid on
those earnings. 39 Defendants thus far have not advocated that other
payroll deductions also should be used to reduce the award;40 however,
the Liepelt court indicated that small payroll deductions could also be
excluded. *'
The second tax problem encompasses all types of damage awards
but arises only when the case is tried before a jury. Defendants request
an instruction informing the jury of the nontaxability of the award in
fear that the "tax-conscious" jury,4 2 unaware of the statutory exclu-
sion,43 will erroneously assume the award is taxable and must be in-
flated in order to make the plaintiff whole.' The well-established
principle of law that a jury will not be permitted to impeach its ver-
dict45 precludes post-trial inquiry into the method by which the jury
calculated the award amount. While empirical evidence is unavail-
able,46 verdicts that substantially exceed the award amount expected by
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38. E.g., Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 491. Contra Grant v. Vollman, 526 F. Supp. 15, 21 (D. Minn.
1981) (court-requested computations using both net and gross incomes differed very little).
39. See, e.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 288 (9th Cir. 1975); HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 31, at § 25.12. Although the goal of a damage award is to make the plaintiff
whole, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, courts have argued that even an award based on
gross income does not place the plaintiff in a "better" position because all losses are not recover-
able. Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 89 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976);
Louissant v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 130, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682-83 (1981).
40. For the rationale regarding why other deductions should not be included, see Fitzpatrick,
supra note 5, at 107-08. But see Marynik v. Burlington N., Inc., 317 N.W.2d 347, 351 n.2 (Minn.
1982).
41. 444 U.S. at 494-95 n.7.
42. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
44. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 496-97; Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 296-97 (9th
Cir. 1975); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 883 (1971).
45. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b); McCoRMcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 68, at
148 (2d ed. 1972); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T 606[03] at 606-22; 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2349, at 681 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
46. See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Infury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
158 (1958). But see Blake v. Delaware & H. Ry., 484 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1973) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting) (experience as trial judge indicates that jurors do consider taxes); Wagner v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, _, 129 N.E.2d 771, 772 (1955) (new trial in which jury instruction
1984]
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the parties47 and questions concerning the tax consequences of the
award submitted to the court by the jury during deliberation" support
the claim that juries improperly inflate awards.
Although both issues relate to the manner in which juries deter-
mine damage awards, each focuses on a different aspect of the prob-
lem49 and should be analyzed independently.50 Unfortunately, courts
have often confused the two issues, 5' utilizing arguments applicable to
the evidence issue as the basis for refusing the nontaxability instruc-
tion.52 Courts must recognize this fundamental difference at the outset
was given resulted in reduction of award from $130,000 to $80,000). Wagner is discussed in Mor-
ris & Nordstrom, supra note 11, at 276.
47. See, e.g., Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 497 (jury award of $775,000 when plaintifl's expert testified
to loss of only $302,000). Some courts seem to require proof that the jury actually considered
income taxes in calculating the award. See, e.g., Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1097 (5th
Cir. 1980). This burden is difficult to meet given the wide range of damages that can be awarded
for nonpecuniary losses.
48. See Kennett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 560 F.2d 456, 462 (lst Cir. 1977); Gait v. Poor
Sisters, 375 F.2d 539, 548 (6th Cir. 1967); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 186 Kan. 345, _
350 P.2d 18, 25 (1960); Ingle v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 608 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
Haney v. Burgin, 106 N.H. 213, ..._, 208 A.2d 448, 452 (1965); Coleman v. New York City Transit
Auth., 37 N.Y.2d 137, .._, 332 N.E.2d 850, 858, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663, 670 (1975); Towli v. Ford Motor
Co., 30 A.D.2d 319, ..._, 292 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (1968); see also Maus v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R.,
165 Ohio St. 281, _., 135 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1956) (recognizing that jurors might inquire about
taxes).
The effect of the court's denial of the jury's request may also continue long after the trial is
completed. Counsel for the defendant in Maus suggested that a juror's perception of justice is
adversely influenced when he subsequently learns that his computation of the damage award was
based on a false assumption of the law. See Knachel, Jury Instructions on Tax Exemption in
Personal Injury Cases, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 71, 73 (1957).
49. The prohibition against the introduction of tax evidence prevents consideration of rele-
vant tax factors by the jury, while the refusal to give the instruction allows the jury to consider
erroneous information. The issues are usually argued in tandem because a claim that includes lost
wages produces a large verdict. Receipt of large sums of money triggers thoughts of tax conse-
quences. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
50. See Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 296 (9th Cir. 1975); Domeracki v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 526 F. Supp. 226, 228 (N.D. Ill.), rep'd, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th
Cir. 1981); Burns, supra note 11, at 330; Elligett, supra note 22, at 644 n.2; Feldman, supra note 11,
at 280; Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 11, at 275; Nordstrom, supra note 11, at 212-15; Roettger,
The Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes in Negligence Actions, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 2
(1961); Note, Computation of Lost Future Earnings in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions,
11 IND. L. Rav. 647, 667 (1978); Comment, Income Taxation and the Calculation of Tort Damage
Awards: The Ram/fcations of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
289, 290 n.13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Ramiflcations].
51. See St. Johns River Terminal Co. v. Vaden, 190 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966);
Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 505, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956); Reeves v. Louisiana & Ark.
Ry., 304 So. 2d 370 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Richmond Gas Corp. v. Reeves, 158 Ind. App. 338, _
302 N.E.2d 795, 811-12 (1973); Paducah Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983); Bracy v. Great N. Ry., 136 Mont, 65, _ 343 P.2d 848 (1959).
52. The most frequent erroneous objection to the jury instruction is the argument concerning
the conjectural nature of taxes, an allegation that is unrelated to the nontaxability instruction. See,
e.g., Bracy v. Great N. Ry., 136 Mont. 65, - 343 P.2d 848 (1959).
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and weigh each issue on its own merits. A decision to exclude net in-
come tax evidence does not warrant automatic refusal of the jury in-
struction. 3 Ironically, when the court refuses to permit the admission
of tax evidence and also refuses to give the nontaxability instruction,
the risk of overcompensation by defendant is doubled: not only will the
jury fail to deduct tax liability from lost wages but it also may increase
the total award to compensate for taxes it may assume the plaintiff will
owe on the award itself. Thus defendant could pay twice for taxes the
plaintiff will never owe.54
The Supreme Court in Liepelt" examined the tax issues indepen-
dently and found the arguments against both to be unpersuasive.5 6 All
state and federal FELA decisions to the contrary were clearly over-
ruled.57 The decision by most courts to apply Liepelt retroactively and
require a new trial if the trial court had failed to give the instruction 58
was approved by the Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore v. Mobil Oil
Corp .9 Notwithstanding the Guyf Offshore decision, some courts have
refused to reverse and remand on the damages issue unless the defend-
ant was harmed by the error.6 ° Questions concerning the wording of a
53. This "compromise" position has been accepted by some courts. See, e.g., Domeracki v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971).
54. Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
56. Id. at 494, 498.
57. See, e.g., Flanigan v. Burlington N., Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 921 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Fulton v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 675 F.2d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 1982);
O'Byrne v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 632 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1980); Lang v. Texas & Pac. Ry.,
624 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (5th Cir. 1980); Cazad v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 622 F.2d 72, 75-76 (4th
Cir. 1980); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Yow, 384 So. 2d 13, 13 (1980); Crabtree v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 89 Ill. App. 3d 35, _ 411 N.E.2d 19, 24 (1980).
59. 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981). Gulf Offshore was a case arising under the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1360 (1982). Because Congress indicated that the law
of the state governed when not inconsistent with federal common law, the Court remanded to the
Texas Court of Appeals for that determination. 453 U.S. at 488. On remand, the Texas state court
held that Louisiana law did not require the instruction and that federal common law did not
displace state law under OCSLA. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 628 S.W.2d 171, 173-75
(Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
60. See, e.g., Vanskike v. AFC Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 206-07 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Flanigan v. Burlington N., Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 889-90 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Kelly v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R, 552 F. Supp. 399, 402 (W.D. Mo.
1982); Caribe Tugboat Corp. v. Duffy, 427 So. 2d 227, 227 (Fla. App. Ct. 1983); Marynik v. Bur-
lington N., Inc., 317 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Minn. 1982); Bair v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 647
S.W.2d 507, 512-13 (Mo. 1983); Dunn v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 621 S.W.2d 245, 254 (Mo.
1981); Brazell v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 632 S.W.2d 277, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Faulkenberry v.
Kansas City S. Ry., 661 P.2d 510, 512-13 (Okla. 1983).
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nontaxability instruction6 and the admissibility of gross income evi-
dence in FELA cases 62 continue to arise in both state and federal
courts.
Because Liepelt was not decided on a constitutional basis, courts
are not obligated to apply it in non-FELA cases.63 The Court in 6ri/f
Offshore amplified the Liepelt holding by stating that it "articulated a
federal common law rule . . . [and] furthers strong federal policies of
fairness and efficiency in litigation of federal claims." Federal courts
have subsequently extended Liepelt to actions arising under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,6 admiralty juris-
diction,66 the Jones Act,67 and securities law. 68 The Second Circuit has
chosen to stretch Liepelt to its maximum limits, holding that it applies
"to all federal claims for future lost wages."' 69 It appears that Liepelt
will continue to influence the development of federal law in non-FELA
cases and will eventually be binding in all federal cases.70
Opportunity for conflict and division looms on the horizon, how-
ever, for two types of cases tried in federal courts: Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA)71 cases and diversity72 cases. Although the two tax-dam-
age issues were litigated in these types of cases prior to Liepelt ,7 reso-
lution was accomplished by ascertaining and applying the law of the
state which inevitably excluded both net tax evidence and the instruc-
61. See Ybarra v. Burlington N., Inc., 689 F.2d 147, 154 (8th Cir. 1982); Looft v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 104 Ill. App. 3d 152, 432 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (1982).
62. The Liepelt holding does not preclude plaintiff's introduction of gross income evidence.
Vanskike v. AFC Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 211-12 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982).
63. See 444 U.S. at 492-93.
64. 453 U.S. at 486-87.
65. See Rother v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 540 F. Supp. 477, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Roselli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
66. See Paquette v. Atlanska-Plovidba, 701 F.2d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 1983); O'Shea v.
Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir. 1982).
67. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant", 552 F. Supp. 367, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Brown v. Penrod Drilling, 534 F. Supp. 696, 699 (W.D. La. 1982); Portier v. Texaco, Inc., 426 So.
2d 623, 630 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Because the Jones Act incorporates the FELA provisions, the
Liepell holding should be mandatory in all actions arising under the Jones Act. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1976).
68. See Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 183 (8th Cir. 1982).
69. Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).
70. See Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277, 1287 (W.D. Pa.
1983).
71. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976). The FTCA creates the right to bring suit against
the federal government but applies the substantive law of the state. Id. § 1346(b). See Annot., 47
A.L.R. FED 735 (1980).
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
73. See supra notes 12-13, 19-21 and accompanying text.
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tion. Circuit courts in FTCA cases sometimes circumvented state law
that precluded the use of net income as the measure of damages by
holding that damage awards for lost wages in excess of net income
were, in reality, punitive damages and could not be assessed against the
federal government.74 The Third Circuit and several district courts
have not adopted this interpretation since Liepelt,75 while the Fifth Cir-
cuit has chosen to do so. 7 6
The controversy in diversity cases is more recent. Decisions prior
to Liepelt usually cited Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 77 as requiring federal
courts to apply the substantive law of the state in actions based upon
diversity. 8  Most decisions rendered since Liepelt have followed this
same pattern,79 an approach which assumes that the tax issues are
clearly substantive matters. In view of Supreme Court decisions which
have modified Erie,8" this assumption is no longer valid.81 The Second
Circuit has specifically left open the question as to whether a Liepelt
charge must be given in a diversity action;8 2 however, the Eighth Cir-
cuit has suggested that due process may require the application of
Liepelt in diversity cases.83 The need for a uniform approach to the tax
issues in diversity cases is now being examined by both state and fed-
74. See, e.g., Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). Contra Kalavity v.
United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1979).
75. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1982); Erickson v. United
States, 504 F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.S.D. 1980); Draisma v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1317, 1327
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
76. See Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
78. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Fenasci v. Travelers Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir.) (applying Louisiana
law which gives the trial judge discretion in admitting net income evidence), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1123 (1981); Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112,118 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that New York
law does not allow net tax evidence or the instruction); Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621
F.2d 1154, 1158 (1st Cir. 1980) (refusing to apply Liepelt when New Hampshire law was unclear);
Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1097 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Louisiana law which does
not require the tax instruction); Gerbich v. Evans, 525 F. Supp. 817, 819 (D. Colo. 1981) (applying
Colorado law to preclude net tax evidence and the jury instruction); cf. Bartak v. Be-Galyardt &
Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 531 (1980) (remanding and urging the trial court to consider Liepelt in
determining South Dakota law).
80. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,464-74 (1965) (federal law governs ifa federal procedural
rule addresses the issue); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958)
(countervailing federal considerations); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (out-
come-determinative test).
81. For thorough discussions of diversity law, see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill.,
526 F. Supp. 226, 233 (N.D. IM. 1981) (Illinois law should be applied), rev'd, 701 F.2d 1189, 1200
(7th Cir. 1983) (federal law governs).
82. See Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982).
83. Grant v. City of Duluth, 672 F.2d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing and remanding for
failure to give the tax instruction in spite of a 1978 Minnesota decision to the contrary).
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eral courts. 4
The response to Liepelt by state courts in actions governed by state
law was predictable in light of the position taken by most courts during
the past thirty years.85  An overwhelming majority of states have ad-
hered to prior law by summarily distinguishing Liepelt as a case involv-
ing only federal procedural law in FELA cases, 86 by rejecting its
rationale,87 or by ignoring it entirely.88  Some states have even em-
braced the majority rule for the first time without discussing Liepelt.89
Even though commentator support is still strong,90 few state courts
have found Liepelt persuasive. 9' Unfortunately, most states have failed
to consider the rationale of Liepelt in their haste to reject it as only a
statement of federal law. This approach is regrettable since the argu-
84. Compare Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1097 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the need
for uniformity in non-FELA cases) with Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, .._ 438 A.2d 1330,
1334 (1982) (perceiving advantage of uniform rule).
85. See supra notes 11-12, 23 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Irwin v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 709, 717, 184 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232
(1982); Johnson v. Hoover Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 994, _, 439 N.E.2d 1284, 1294-
95 (1982); Newlin v. Foresman, 103 IlL. App. 3d 1038, _ 432 N.E.2d 319, 326 (1982); Christou v.
Arlington Park-Wash. Park Race Tracks Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, ._, 432 N.E.2d 920, 925
(1982); Amos v. Altenthal, 645 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Tennis v. General Motors
Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 227-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Terveer v. Baschnagel, 3 Ohio App. 312,
445 N.E.2d 264, 268 (1982); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d 534, 538-39 (S.D. 1982).
87. See, eg., Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 433-35 (Alaska 1983); Paducah
Area Pub. Library v. Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19, 23-24 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Louissaint v. Hudson
Waterways, Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 128-30, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682-83 (1981); Scallon v. Hooper,
293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.D. App. 1982); Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 439-41 (W. Va.
1982); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1365-67 (Wyo. 1981); cf. Delmarva Power & Light v.
Burrows, 435 A.2d 716, 721 (Del. 1981); Martinez v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 423 So. 2d
1088, 1091 (La. 1982); South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 827-28 (N.D.
1980).
88. See, e.g., Cornejo v. Probst, 6 Kan. App. 2d 529, .._., 630 P.2d 1202, 1209 (1981); Wolfe v.
Jones, 405 So. 2d 1182, 1182-83 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Moran v. Canal Indem. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d
1243, 1245 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Sullivan v. Held, 81 A.D.2d 663, 664, 438 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361
(1981); Stovall v. Perius, 61 Or. App. 650, _..., 659 P.2d 393, 399 (1983); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa.
534, - 421 A.2d 674, 680 (1980); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 599 S.W.2d 633, 638-39
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Boeke v. International Paint Co., 27 Wash. App. 611, .. , 620 P.2d 103, 106-
07 (1980).
89. See Maricle v. Spiegel, 213 Neb. 223, ..._, 329 N.W.2d 80, 86-87 (1983); Cates v. Brown,
278 Ark. 242,._.., 645 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (1983); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406,....., 643
S.W.2d 526, 532 (1983).
90. See Elligett, supra note 22, at 660; Roettger, supra note 50, at 301; Recent Cases, Jur,
Review of Tax Consequences of FELA Damage Awards Now Considered Appropriate, 26 Loy. L.
RaV. 409 (1980); Note, Damages-A Jury ShouldReceive Evidence and Instructions Concerning the
Impact of Federal Income Taxation on an Award of Damages, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 873
(1981). Contra Franz, supra note 35, at 57.
91. Butsee Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, ..._, 417 A.2d 15, 18 (1980); Dennis v. Blanchfield,
48 Md. App. 325, _.., 428 A.2d 80, 87 (1981), af'd, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330 (1982); In re Eader,
70 Ohio Misc. 17, _ 434 N.E.2d 757,759-60 (1982); Stowell v. Simpson, - Vt. _, 470 A.2d 1176,
1179 (1983); cf. Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 380 Mass. 362, _., 403 N.E.2d 402, 407 (1980)
(decision to give the instruction is discretionary with the trial judge).
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ments against the admissibility of net income evidence or the use of the
jury instruction are even more tenuous in the tax-conscious 1980's.
III. INTRODUCTION OF TAX EVIDENCE
Compensation for past and future lost wages is awarded in a lump
sum following the single recovery rule.92 This practice allows the court
to avoid continual supervision of periodic awards and permits final dis-
position of the case.93 It appears doubtful that courts will abandon this
practice even though a change to periodic payments could promote ac-
curacy in the awarding of compensation for future lost wages.94 Under
the present practice, the calculation of adequate compensation for
wages that would have been earned at some future time is a difficult
task.
The necessary choice between the use of net or gross income in this
calculation is further complicated by wrongful death statutes that only
allow recovery for "pecuniary losses."9" Some state wrongful death
statutes specifically exclude taxes from the recovery96 while others are
silent regarding taxes.97 In the latter instance, courts can construe the
statute to include or exclude the amount of taxes that would have been
paid on lost wages. 98 Decisions that include the tax liability create an
anomaly in that the survivors are allowed to recover an amount that
the victim would never have realized. 99
An inconsistency in the calculation of lost wages is created by de-
cisions that use net income for wrongful death actions and gross in-
come for personal injury actions."° Arguably, the different methods of
calculating damages can be justified on the basis of the action's nature.
92. See Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a f'd, 466 F.2d
1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
93. Id.
94. Id. The Supreme Court of Canada is experiencing frustration with future compensatory
damages and has proposed reviewable periodic payments as an alternative to speculation. See
Tragedy in The Supreme Court of Canada: New Developments in the Assessment of Damages for
Personal Injuries, 37 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 1, 5-6 & n.24 (1979).
95. Eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053(B) (1981). "The damages recoverable in actions for
wrongful death ... shall include the following:... The pecuniary loss to the survivors based
upon properly admissible evidence . I..." d.
96. Eg., FLA. STAT. § 768.18(5) (1981).
97. Eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (West Supp. 1983-84); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053(B)
(1981).
98. See Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 626-32 (D.S.C. 1967); In re Oskar
Tiedemann & Co., 236 F. Supp. 895, 907 (D. Del. 1964); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J.
466, - 341 A.2d 613, 628 (1975).
99. Mosley v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 357, 360 n.3 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
100. See Erickson v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.S.D. 1980); Gorham v. Farming-
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Since wrongful death actions are statutory, the decision to limit the
amount recoverable is legislative and unrelated to damages available
under common law negligence. Absent specific statutory wording,,"1
however, no distinction should be made between personal injury and
wrongful death actions.10 2
Courts have relied upon a variety of reasons to prohibit defen-
dants from introducing evidence of the plaintiffs tax liability in cases
involving compensation for lost wages. The following sections analyze
the most frequently used arguments.
A. Future Taxes Are Too Speculative
Courts that reject net income evidence are primarily concerned
about the uncertainty of the plaintiff's future taxes 0 3 since many fac-
tors affect income tax liability."° During any time period for which tax
rates and income levels are known factors, however, the tax liability
can be calculated with reasonable certainty. Tax liability on lost wages
for the period of time prior to the jury's calculation of the award also
falls within this category.10 5 Such tax amounts are potentially substan-
tial given the average time between the filing of the lawsuit and the
actual trial.10 6
In calculating the compensation for future lost wages, however,
the uncertainty as to future tax rates does create concern. The potential
for undercompensation is created when the award is reduced to present
value. 07 Additionally, when a plaintiff is to be compensated for future
net earnings, the tax to be deducted must be calculated using present
tax rates. If the tax rates subsequently change in favor of the plaintiff,
undercompensation has occurred because the defendant actually com-
pensated the plaintiff for less than the plaintiff would have eventually
ton Motor Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466,
__ 341 A.2d 613, 628 n.27 (1975).
101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
102. See Elligett, supra note 22, at 646.
103. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling, 510 F.2d 234,236-37 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975); Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944); Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665, 673
(Alaska 1967); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 667, 151 Cal. Rptr.
399, 422 (1978); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d 534, 539 (S.D. 1982).
104. The Liepelt Court acknowledged this problem when it stated, "Admittedly there are
many variables that may affect the amount of a wage earner's future income-tax liability. The law
may change, his family may increase in size, his spouse's earnings may affect his tax bracket, and
extra income or unforeseen deductions may become available." 444 U.S. at 494.
105. See Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1977).
106. See Burger, Isn't There A Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275-76 (1982).
107. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:702
15
Vaughan: Tax Issues of Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Awards
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
TAX ISSUES
netted. Courts reason that the only way to prevent such undercompen-
sation is to exclude net income evidence entirely.'08 However, the fear
of undercompensation caused by changes in the tax rates is unfounded.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that a plaintiffs future tax liability
will worsen given the massive federal deficits.'t 9 Even though room for
disagreement exists as to the precise rates of future taxes, "the old saw
about the certainty of taxes is still good.""'
The Supreme Court in Liepelt recognized the weakness of the
speculation argument when it stated, "[Fluture employment itself, fu-
ture health, future personal expenditures, future interest rates, and fu-
ture inflation are also matters of estimate and prediction.""' Other
"uncertain" factors that are relevant to future lost income include pro-
motions,"12 earning capacity," 3 and stability of familial relation-
ships." 4  In rejecting these factors as being sufficient to justify the
exclusion of tax evidence, the Liepelt Court stated:
Any one of these issues might provide the basis for protracted
expert testimony and debate. But the practical wisdom of the
trial bar and the trial bench has developed effective methods
of presenting the essential elements of an expert calculation in
a form that is understandable by juries that are increasingly
familiar with the complexities of modem life. We therefore
reject the notion that the introduction of evidence describing
a decedent's estimated after-tax earnings is too speculative
• . . for a jury.' 15
The holding by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Furumizo" 6
108. See Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S & M/S Trolleggen, 333 F.2d 308, 314 (2d
Cir. 1964); McWeeney v. New York, N.H., & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 364
U.S. 870 (1960).
109. See Reagan's Good-Times Budget, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 30, 1984, at 70, 71.
110. United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1967).
111. 444 U.S. at 494.
112. See, e.g., O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1959); Sabine Towing Co.
v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1936).
113. See, e.g., In re Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15, 26-27 (D.N.Y.
1965), modfiqed, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Some courts solve
the earning capacity problem by allowing increases to be offset by the discount rate. See Bealieu
v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967); Kaczkowski v. Bokebasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa.
1980).
Earning capacity for children, especially infants, is the ultimate in prognostication as no past
earning record exists. To aid the jury in calculating future lost wages, hypothetical careers are
used. E.g., Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. See Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975).
115. 444 U.S. at 494.
116. United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
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allowed the award to be based on present net income.1 7 This is clearly
the more "modem and reasonable" rule."" The possible changes in
tax laws that would favor the plaintiff are offset by potential adverse
developments. It is unjust to allow only the plaintiff an opportunity to
prove matters that are speculative." 9 Certainty of awards is clearly a
goal that should be fostered, but fairness to defendants cannot be sacri-
ficed in pursuit of this ideal.' 20
B. The Net Income Rule Would Overburden the Courts
The litigation explosion is a genuine concern of courts across the
nation. As the number of cases being filed continues to increase, 12
courts search for additional ways to streamline the judicial process.' 22
It is argued that the net income rule increases the quantity and com-
plexity of the evidence in a trial, resulting in a burden on the adminis-
tration of justice. 23 The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Tenore v. Nu
Car Carriers, Inc. 2 acknowledged this potential problem but did not
believe that the problem would be "insurmountable for the trial courts
or juries. '
The Supreme Court in Liepelt recognized that the use of the net
income rule would require the admission of additional evidence relat-
ing to the award investment, but stated, "[T]he fact that such an...
estimate. . . would also be admissible does not persuade us that it is
wrong to use after-tax figures instead of gross earnings in projecting
what the decedent's financial contributions to his survivors would have
been . . 126
The Court then attempted to reduce the added burden of the net
income rule when it stated that evidence of the plaintiffs tax liability
can be disallowed when the effect is de minimus.' 27 This approach is
akin to the flexible rule utilized by the Second Circuit before the
117. Id. at 970.
118. Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, ..._, 341 A.2d 613, 627-28 (1975).
119. Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nordstrom,
supra note 11, at 227.
120. See Burlington, 529 F.2d at 298.
121. BurgerAnnual Report on the State ofthe Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 443 (1983).
122. Id. at 444-47.
123. See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 434 (Alaska 1983); Note, Ran0fcations,
supra note 50, at 294-95. Contra Brief for Petitioner at 20, Liepelt.
124. 67 N.J.' 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975).
125. Id. at _ 341 A.2d at 628.
126. 444 U.S. at 495.
127. Id. at 494-95 n.7.
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Liepelt decision; 28 however, it expands the use of net income evidence
substantially. Some state courts have followed the de minimus concept
by admitting net income evidence only when the tax burden is
severe. 
29
As a practical matter, income tax is only one of the many factors to
which expert witnesses must testify. It is unlikely that counsel for
either party will unduly prolong tax testimony because of its possible
anesthetizing effect upon the jury. In reality the actual time necessary
to present net income evidence is insubstantial in comparison to the
time spent on earnings evidence that already must be introduced by the
plaintiff to substantiate the lost wages claim.
30
C. Reduction of the Awardfor Taxes Violates the Collateral Source
Rule and Congressional Intent
The collateral source rule is a rule of evidence that prohibits the
introduction of evidence regarding benefits received by the plaintiff
from external sources.' 3' Third-party relationships such as insurance
contracts, employment agreements, or gratuities from friends and rela-
tives serve to reduce the plaintiffs actual losses. Courts reason that
defendants should not be allowed to benefit by a reduction in the
amount of damages owed simply because the plaintiff received outside
assistance. 32 Some courts have analogized the reduction of damages
by the amount of tax liability to a reduction for benefits received from
a collateral source; accordingly, consideration of tax evidence violates
the collateral source rule.133
Use of the collateral source rule to exclude net tax evidence is im-
proper because the concepts differ inherently. The collateral source
rule excludes evidence of benefits received by the plaintiff in instances
when the plaintiff was fortunate in receiving donated services or fortui-
tous enough to prepare contractually for future emergencies. The col-
128. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
129. See Martinez v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 423 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Marynik v. Burlington N., Inc., 317 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Minn. 1982).
130. Cf. Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d. 284, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1975).
131. See Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant Prin-
ciple and the Functional Approach, 58 Ky. L.J. 36, 38-40 (1969); Note, Unreason in the Law of
Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV. 741, 741 (1964).
132. See, e.g., Majestic v. Louisville & N.R.R., 147 F.2d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 1945).
133. See W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406,_. 643 S.W.2d 526, 532 (1982); Kawamoto
v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, _., 410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 535
(Me. 1978); Note, Ramfcations, supra note 50, at 296.
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lateral source rule is an exception to the general goal of damages 34
because it allows the plaintiff to be overcompensated.135 The rule fos-
ters advanced planning and the rendering of assistance in time of need,
both of which are matters of personal choice between the plaintiff and
others. Taxes, on the other hand, are liabilities imposed upon the
plaintiff as a matter of law. Admission of this evidence in an action for
damages would not interfere with the plaintiff's private relationships.
It is also argued that a societal purpose of aiding innocent tort victims
is furthered by allowing the victim to receive the prospective tax, while
no such purpose would be served by allowing the defendant to
benefit. 136
Another argument against admission of tax evidence based on a
third-party relationship is the claim that reduction of an award to ac-
count for taxes frustrates congressional intent. It has been suggested by
courts that Congress intended to give the injured plaintiff a tax break
by excluding the award from taxable gross income and that any at-
tempt to reduce that award because of taxation would nullify congres-
sional intent. 37  The Liepelt Court scrutinized the Congressional
Record and found no such intent. 138 Additionally, the Court stated
that "netting out the taxes that the decedent would have paid does not
confer a benefit on the tortfeasor any more that netting out the dece-
dent's personal expenditures."' 139 A tortfeasor is not "benefitted" when
the damage award is based on actual pecuniary losses.' 40
Rulings that permit net income evidence to be admitted contradict
neither the collateral source rule nor congressional intent. If the goal of
compensatory damage awards is truly to put the plaintiff in the position
134. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
135. Note, Ramfcations supra note 50, at 296 n.58.
136. Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 537 F.2d
726 (3d Cir. 1976).
137. The first published opinion to so hold was Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-
52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955); accord Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 812 (6th Cir. 1978);
Lumber Terminals, Inc., v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, ._, 373 A.2d 282, 292 (1977); Louissant
v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 129, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682 (1981); Ericksen v.
Boyer, 225 N.W.2d 66, 74 (N.D. 1974); see also Yorio, The Taxation ofDamages: Tax and Non-
Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 734 (1977) (discussing the emotional and
practical factors behind the exception).
138. 444 U.S. at 496 n.10. Justices Blackman and Marshall argued in Liepelt that congres-
sional intent to give a tax break can be found in Congress' failure to repeal the exemption. 444
U.S. at 502.
139. Id.
140. Id. Petitioner argued that Congress did not believe that damages were income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. Brief for Petitioner at n.23, Liepelt. Although this argu-
ment is consistent with the majority opinion, the Court did not address the constitutional issue.
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he would have enjoyed had the injury not occurred, 14 1 then decisions
concerning calculation of an award should not revolve around a "bene-
fit" to either party.142 Although a reduced award is "beneficial" to the
defendant in a purely economic sense, it is not actually a true "benefit"
in a legal sense if the law does not define it as such.
D. Plaintiff's Tax Liabilities Are of No Concern to the Tortfeasor
In the first reported English case discussing the taxation of dam-
ages, the court declared that matters of taxation are between the Crown
and the taxpayer and are of no concern to the wrongdoer. 143 American
courts have adopted this argument and continue to justify a gross in-
come award on the grounds that the tax liability of the plaintiff is a
matter between the government and the plaintiff.'"
This argument is weak in that it fails to distinguish the fundamen-
tal difference between compensatory and punitive damages. Compen-
satory damages are designed to restore the plaintiff to a former
position, 14 while punitive damages serve to punish the tortfeasor and
to deter similar behavior in others.'" Although awards for lost wages
are one type of compensatory damages, a defendant effectively is being
punished when forced to pay a lost-wages award in excess of the
amount the plaintiff actually would have accumulated. 47 Addition-
ally, while it is accepted that a victim should be allowed to dispose of
the damage award in his own way once it is received from the
tortfeasor, a deduction of taxes from the amount awarded does not in-
terfere with this right because the reduction to reflect tax liability oc-
curs before the award is made. Any decision influencing the
measurement of damages is a proper one for the court.
48
E. Jurors Are Unable To Understand Complex Tax Information
The subject of taxation, like other types of admissible technical
141. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
142. Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 11, at 277.
143. Fairholme v. Firth & Brown Ltd., 149 L.T.R. (n.s.) 332, 333 (K.B. 1933).
144. See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 IlL. 2d 135, _ 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955); Michaud v.
Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 535 (Me. 1978); Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 2d
124, - 373 A.2d 282, 291 (1977); Eriksen v. Boyer, 225 N.W.2d 66, 74 (N.D. 1974); Missouri-
Kansas-Texas Ry. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, _ 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956).
145. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
146. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 9.
147. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 509, 134 N.E. 2d 555, 556 (1956).
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information, is voluminous and complex. Some courts have paternalis-
tically stated that tax information is too complex for the jury to under-
stand and properly apply during deliberation. '4 9 Other courts fear that
the tax issue will overshadow the issue of liability and other damage
calculation factors. 5 '
The Ninth Circuit reasoned to the opposite conclusion in Burling-
ton Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger:15' "[T]oday's sophisticated jurors
surely have had some personal experience in determining their own tax
liability, and in today's tax-conscious society we are confident that our
juries and judges, with the aid of such competent expert testimony as
may be received, are equal to the task and the responsibility."' 52 The
Liepelt Court also rejected the complexity argument, stating that the
trial bar and bench have "developed effective methods of presenting
the essential elements of an expert calculation in a form that is under-
standable by juries that are increasingly familiar with the complexities
of modern life."' 53 Empirical evidence also suggests that most tax testi-
mony regarding individual income taxes would not be overly com-
plex.' 5 4 The argument is even more tenuous when one considers other
types of evidence admitted during trials. Jurors routinely consider
complex, technical evidence in medical malpractice and product liabil-
ity cases and assess damages for nonpecuniary losses such as pain and
suffering. Additionally, the complexity argument is of less merit for
cases tried without ajury.' 5  Although the exclusion of net income evi-
dence arguably may promote judicial simplicity, it does not effectuate
justice.' 5 6
149. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling, 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d 534, 539 (S.D. 1982).
150. See McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 36-37; Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1349
(E.D. Pa. 1970), a'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
151. 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
152. Id. at 293.
153. 444 U.S. at 494; see also Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (maintaining that trial judge can eliminate confusing testimony under FED. R. EvID.
403).
154. Less than one-third of all Americans filed itemized returns in 1981, and 39% used the
1040A short form. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1981 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN
STATISTICS 5, 49 (1983).
155. See Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1982); Downs v. United
States, 522 F.2d 990, 1005 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259, 265 (5th Cir.
1969); Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 632 (D.S.C. 1967).
156. See Brooks, 273 F. Supp. at 630.
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F. Reduction to Present Worth Results in Undercompensation
The plaintiff who receives a lump sum award is being compen-
sated in advance of the injury. To correct this anomaly, courts reduce
the damage award to a sum that, if invested, would provide an amount
equal to that lost. 15 7 This process is commonly known as reduction to
present worth.15 8 Although the actual damage award for personal in-
jury is excluded from gross income, the interest earned on the award
following investment is taxable. 59 It is claimed that the reduction of
an award to present worth actually undercompensates the plaintiff be-
cause the interest earned on the invested award is taxable. 60 Addition-
ally, the exclusion of evidence regarding plaintiff's attorney's fees
compounds the problem of undercompensation. Investment award in-
terest is calculated on the total damage amount; however, plaintiff has
substantially less money to invest after the attorney's fees are paid. 16 1
Courts deal with reduction to present worth in a variety of ways.
Some ignore the problem by allowing the discount rate to be offset by
inflation.162 Those courts that consider the tax impact on the invested
award either reduce the tax rate to reflect this future liability before
discounting the award, 63 or they determine tax liability, reduce to
present value, and then "add back" the taxes that must be paid on the
investment.'64
Although courts have often noted that damage awards can never
be made with mathematical certainty, 65 commentators are statistically
157. See, e.g., Brady v. Tipton, 407 P.2d 194, 205 (Okla. 1965).
158. "[Wlhere future payments are to be anticipated and capitalized in a verdict the plaintiff is
entitled to no more than their present worth .. " Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Proffitt, 241 U.S.
462, 493 (1916).
159. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34. Taxation of award
interest is premised on the assumption that it will be invested in plans which are taxable. Defend-
ants have recently begun to argue the availability of tax shelters to negate the allowance for invest-
ment taxes. See, e.g., DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 667, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 422 (1979).
160. See Saurs v. Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238, 247 (9th Cir. 1979); Flannery v. United States,
297 S.E.2d 433, 441 (W. Va. 1982); Sf. First Nat'l Bank v. Material Serv. Corp., 597 F.2d 1110,
1120 (7th Cir. 1979) (expert testimony that tax liability deductions were offset by investment
taxes).
161. See Burke & Rosen, Taxes and Compensation for Lost Earnings: A Comment, 12 J. LE-
GAL STuD. 195, 197 (1983).
162. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 1982). The
"total offset method" is simple, yet is criticized as being imprecise. See Elligett, supra note 22, at
651.
163. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 632 (D.S.C. 1967).
164. See DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 844 (9th Cir. 1982); McWeeney, 282 F.2d at
37.
165. E.g., Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1967).
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exploring the different approaches to awarding damages.' 66 No com-
prehensive model has yet been developed. 167 It is clear, however, that
problems of reduction to present worth must also be solved when gross
earnings are used as the measure of damages and thus should not serve
as an obstacle to the introduction of net tax evidence.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTION
It is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury before it retires to
render its decision.' 68 Instructions inform the jury of the law to be ap-
plied and help to reduce erroneous conclusions.' 69 Each juror brings
his own knowledge and experience into the deliberation room. Be-
cause this reality cannot be overlooked, jurors are allowed to utilize
their "own general experience and knowledge" in arriving at a
decision. 170
A presumption exists that jurors do not engage in misconduct dur-
ing deliberation by failing to follow instructions of the court.'7 ' The
jury is typically instructed to limit its deliberation to the evidence ad-
mitted at trial.' 72 In applying common knowledge to this evidence, ju-
rors may unintentionally miscalculate the award. Defendants contend
that a general instruction as to the method of damage calculation actu-
ally contributes to an inaccurate award if unaccompanied by a nontax-
ability instruction. 73 Unless this instruction is given, the potential for
an improper calculation is present each time the jury retires to deliber-
ate. Courts attempt to refute this claim with the following arguments.
166. See Bell, Bodenhorn, & Taub, Taxes and Compensationfor Lost Earnings, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 181 (1983); Brady, Brookshire, & Cobb, Calculating the Effects of Income Taxes on Lost
Earnings, 18 TRIAL, Sept., 1982, at 65; Elliget, supra note 22, at 653-54 & n.68.
167. Elliget, supra note 22, at 652.
168. Each party is given the opportunity to propose instructions, or the judge may choose to
give instructions he has prepared himself. Most states utilize pattern jury instructions. See, e.g.,
OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL. For a comprehensive discussion of pattern jury in-
structions and damage awards, see Graham, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Prospect of Ov'er or
Under Compensation In Damage Awardsfor Personal Injuries, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 33 (1978).
169. See Cantrell v. Henthorn, 624 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Okla. 1981) (Doolin, J., concurring);
Leavitt v. Deichman, 30 Okla. 423, 427, 120 P. 983, 985 (1911).
170. 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.08[4], at 59-121-22 (1983).
171. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 63 (1949).
172. See OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 1.4, at 19-20.
173. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The nontaxability instruction presumes that
the total award is actually nontaxable. If the plaintiff previously deducted from taxable income
medical expenses paid prior to trial, then the instruction would not be a correct statement of the
law.
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A. Jurors Do Not Overcompensate
The nontaxability instruction is often refused on the grounds that
experience and empirical evidence do not support the overcompensa-
tion contention174 or that tax matters were not raised during the trial.1 75
Courts instead prefer to assume that jurors correctly assess damages, 1 76
an assumption that is questionable.1 77
Disagreement among the courts as to the possibility for overcom-
pensation began in Missouri in Dempsey v. Thompson.1 78 The Dempsey
court stated that jurors "are acutely sensitive to the impact of taxes,"' 179
but the court also realized that most Americans are not aware of the
exclusion of damage awards from gross income. 8 ° Unable to divine a
reason for refusing a nontaxability instruction, the court overruled a
state decision to the contrary."' In McWeeney v. New York, New Ha-
ven & Hartford Railroad,182 the Second Circuit refused to reverse a
New York district court for failing to give the instruction, but a strong
dissenting opinion argued that constant media reports of the taxes due
on large sums of money won in quiz programs, lotteries, and sweep-
stakes could create an assumption that awards are also taxable.183 This
line of reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Third' 84 and
Ninth8 5 Circuits. Judge Ely, writing for the Boxberger court, com-
pared the advantages and disadvantages of giving the instruction:
The benefits of informing the jury of the true tax conse-
quences are so clear, and the burden in terms of time and the
possibility of confusion so minimal, that we believe the bal-
ance is overwhelmingly in favor of giving such an instruction.
To put the matter simply, giving the instruction can do no
174. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Griffin v. General Motors, 380 Mass. 362, _ 403 N.E.2d 402, 408 (1980).
176. See Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, _ 298 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1956); Henninger v.
Southern Pac. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, - 59 Cal. Rptr. 76, 81 (1967); Gorham v. Farmington
Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135,.
125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1955); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 536 (Me. 1978); Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863, 867-68 (Okla. 1962).
177. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
178. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
179. Id. at _ 251 S.W.2d at 45.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1960).
183. Id. at 41 (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting). The Second Circuit recently adopted Judge Lum-
bard's dissent in Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982).
184. See Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 883 (1971).
185. See Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
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harm, and it can certainly help by preventing the jury from
inflating the award and thus overcompensating the plaintiff
on the basis of an erroneous assumption that the judgment
will be taxable. 186
The Supreme Court in Lieelt similarly concluded that the benefits jus-
tified the giving of the instruction. 87 Even if the subject of taxation is
not formally argued, the routine use of the previous year's tax return as
evidence of the plaintiffs lost income calls the subject of taxes to the
attention of thejury.188 Although jurors may not intentionally increase
the award in the jury room, the impact of taxation could influence each
juror unconsciously.
B. Cautionary Instructions Are Unnecessary
The purpose of a cautionary instruction is to dispel misconception
about the law;'89 however, the fact that a proposed instruction is a cor-
rect statement of the law does not warrant its submission to the jury if
inapplicable to the facts. 190 For example, the plaintiff is not permitted
to tell the jury that attorney's fees must be paid from the damage
award. 191 Courts use this same reasoning in refusing the nontaxability
instruction.'9 2 The prohibition against the attorney's fees instruction
has also been used to justify exclusion of gross income.'9 It is ironic
that the jury is not permitted to consider attorney's fees and taxes, those
aspects of the calculation of damages that are the most certain.
A fundamental difference exists, however, between attorney's fees
and the income tax exclusion. Jurors know that the attorney for the
plaintiff represents his client for financial remuneration. The jury may
not know the details of a "contingency fee" arrangement, but the
186. Id. at 297.
187. 444 U.S. at 499.
188. See MINZER, supra note I, at 17-41.
189. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 31, at 1327-28.
190. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2522 (1971).
191. The "American rule" does not allow the successful party to recover attorney's fees. See
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975). It has been suggested
that damages for pain and suffering are a substitute for attorney's fees. This approach has been
characterized as using one error to correct another. Fitzpatrick, supra note 5, at 110. Arguably,
the goal of making the plaintiff "whole" can never be met as long as the "American rule" is
followed.
192. See, e.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 115,..., 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955); Barnette
v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1367 (Wyo. 1981).
193. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 668, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 399, 422-23 (1979). But see Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 495-96. "[I]t surely is not proper for the
Judiciary to ignore the demonstrably relevant factor of income tax in measuring damages in order
to offset what may be perceived as an undesirable or unfair rule regarding attorney's fees." Id.
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Supreme Court's decision to permit lawyer advertising 9 4 increases the
probability that future jurors will have some idea of the attorney's fees
that plaintiff will pay. If the jurors choose to inflate the award to pay
the plaintiffs attorney, it would not be repugnant to the notion of jus-
tice, given the goal of compensatory damage awards. However, this
rationale does not justify an inflated award to compensate for nonexis-
tent taxes. If it is unjust to force the plaintiff to pay his attorney from
the award, the rule against awarding attorney's fees should be changed.
Substantive justice is not served by circumventing the rule with false
assumptions about income taxes in the jury room.
C. A Nontaxability Instruction Would Prejudice the Plaintiff
The first two arguments in support of the refusal to grant the tax
instruction are defensive in nature. Some courts have taken an offen-
sive position, stating that the instruction would prejudice the plain-
tiff,195 presumably because the jury would intentionally lower the
award out of jealousy' 96 or would disregard the gross income rule and
calculate the award using an estimated net income amount. 197 This
opposition is the result of instructions that are improperly worded, es-
pecially in jurisdictions using the gross income rule.' 98 Properly
worded instructions will eliminate this source of concern.
In jurisdictions that use gross income as the measure of damages
or allow the introduction of both net and gross income evidence, the
court should first instruct the jury as to the method of calculating the
damages. The court would then give the following tax instruction:
I charge you as a matter of law, that any award to the
plaintiff in this case, if any is made, is not income of the plain-
tiff within the meaning of the federal [state] income tax.
Should you find the plaintiff is entitled to an award of dam-
ages, then you are to follow the instructions already given to
you by this court in measuring damages, and in no event
should you either add or subtract from that award on account
of income taxes.199
194. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
195. See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
196. See Nordstrom, supra note 11, at 234.
197. See Raines v. New York Cent. R.R., 51 Il. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
983 (1972).
198. Some courts have instructed the jury only that it should not consider taxes. See, e.g.,
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
199. G. DOUTHWAITE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 1-26 (1981).
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In a net income jurisdiction, the court should first instruct the jury that
it is to calculate any past or future loss of earnings on the basis of net
income, adding back any amount the plaintiff would pay in taxes on
the interest. The court would then give the nontaxability instruction.
The nontaxability instruction can be given in cases not involving
lost earnings because it applies to all types of damages. Separate and
precisely worded instructions that distinguish the tax consequences of
each issue reduce the chance that the jury will intentionally disregard
the gross income rule or, in net income jurisdictions, further reduce the
award after making a calculation using net income.
V. STATUS OF OKLAHOMA LAW
Oklahoma courts have not addressed either taxation issue in a
non-FELA context. Oklahoma adhered to the majority view by refus-
ing the nontaxability instruction in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
road v. Kinsey.2" The Supreme Court of Oklahoma also followed the
gross income rule in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v. Miller,2°' stat-
ing that "income tax consequences should not be considered, because
of being too conjectural. 20 2
The court did not cite either case in its most recent FELA decision,
Faulkenberry v. Kansas City Southern Railway.20 The Faulkenberry
trial court had refused to give the nontaxability instruction. One week
after the conclusion of the trial, the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision inLiepelt. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
refused to apply Liepelt retroactively.2° The court apparently based its
decision not to reverse the trial court on the absence of any indication
in the record that the evidence admitted did not support the amount of
the award.205 The question remains open as to Oklahoma's willingness
to apply the Liepelt rationale in non-FELA actions.
Oklahoma appellate decisions that discuss damage awards for
both personal injury and wrongful death cases do not discuss taxes. 20 6
200. 372 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1962).
201. 486 P.2d 630 (Okla. 1971).
202. Id. at 636.
203. 661 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1983).
204. Id. at 513.
205. Id.
206. See Thomas v. Cumberland Operating Co., 569 P.2d 974 (Okla. 1977); Evans v. Olson,
550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Harper, 468 P.2d 1014 (Okla. 1970);
Crossett v. Andrews, 277 P.2d 117 (Okla. 1954); Cartwright v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 593 P.2d
104 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
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Conversations with several district court judges, trial attorneys, and
economists in Tulsa County, however, indicate that defendants are per-
mitted to introduce net income evidence at trial.20 7 Thus the current
practice in Oklahoma regarding the admissibility of net income evi-
dence appears to be consistent with Liepelt. While permitting the in-
troduction of net income evidence in actions for lost wages is a partial
step toward resolving taxation issues in injury awards, complete resolu-
tion requires that awards be calculated using net income.
The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions state that the nontax-
ability instruction should not be given.20 8 The only cited authority for
the refusal is Miller,20 9 which conflicts with Liepelt. Thus the status of
the instruction is uncertain in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court should alleviate this uncertainty by revising the Oklahoma Uni-
form Jury Instructions to require the nontaxability instruction in all
cases.
The recent Oklahoma decision in Vanderpool v. State21 1 provides
an additional argument for requiring that awards be calculated on net
income and for instructing juries regarding the nontaxability of the
award. The Vanderpool decision abrogated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in Oklahoma and exposed Oklahoma taxpayers to liability
for torts committed by state employees.21 1 Thus Oklahoma taxpayers
have a vital interest in insuring that personal injury and wrongful death
awards do not overcompensate the plaintiff. The Vanderpool court uti-
lized the underlying purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act in reach-
ing its decision. 22 Consequently, it would seem that the same rationale
used by the federal courts to justify calculation of damages using net
income should apply with equal force in Oklahoma." 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The rationale for extending Liepelt to non-FELA cases is convinc-
207. Interview with Honorable William W. Means, Judge, Oklahoma Court of Appeals, Divi-
sion II (Feb. 7, 1984); Telephone interview with Mr. Richard M. Eldridge, Tulsa litigation attor-
ney (Jan. 6, 1984); Telephone interview with Dr. John Bonham, Professor of Economics, Tulsa
University (Feb. 10, 1984). Contra Interview with Honorable James 0. Ellison, Judge, United
States District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma (Mar. 23, 1984); Telephone interview with
Honorable Jane P. Wiseman, Oklahoma District Judge, Tulsa County (Mar. 19, 1984).
208. OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONs No. 4.15, at 41.
209. 486 P.2d 630 (Okla. 1971).
210. 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
211. Id. at 1156-57.
212. Id. at 1155.
213. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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ing. At a minimum, courts should require the nontaxability instruction
because the benefits of the instruction clearly outweigh the slight incon-
venience that would be incurred. In addition, this Comment maintains
that courts should adopt the net income rule, an approach that permits
the plaintiff to recover only an amount that reflects the true extent of
his injury. Problems associated with net income evidence can be solved
through the use of expert testimony and effective argument by counsel.
Randall G. Vaughan
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